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Abstract. Bayne and McClelland (2016) raise the matching content challenge for proponents of cognitive 
phenomenology: if the phenomenal character of thought is determined by its intentional content, why 
is it that my conscious thought that there is a blue wall before me and my visual perception of a blue 
wall before me don’t share any phenomenology, despite their matching content? In this paper, I first 
show that the matching content challenge is not limited to proponents of cognitive phenomenology but 
extends to cases of cross-modal perception, threatening representationalism about consciousness in 
general. I then give two responses to the challenge, both of which appeal to intentional modes. The 
difference in intentional mode between a thought and a visual perception can either explain why we 
should not expect any phenomenal overlap between the two experiences, or it can make it clear why 
the phenomenal overlap is easy to overlook. I show that these responses are available to the 
representationalist about perceptual consciousness, as well as the proponent of cognitive 
phenomenology. The upshot is that, when it comes to the matching content challenge, both perceptual 
representationalism and cognitive representationalism stand on equal dialectical footing.  
 
 
Surprised at how much time had passed, I 
opened up a browser, called up the New York 
Times, and clicked on the giant headline. The 
article described the helicopters I could hear 
above me. 







In recent philosophy of mind, the cognitive phenomenology debate has been waged on a variety of fronts. 
Some have focused on whether or not there exists a proprietary phenomenology of cognition, a kind 
of phenomenal character that only cognitive states have. Others have focused on the relationship 
between the phenomenal character of cognition and its intentional properties. Tim Bayne and Tom 
McClelland (2016) purport to identify a challenge to proponents of cognitive phenomenology on this 
latter front. In particular, their target is a claim endorsed in the cognitive phenomenology literature:  
 
 
Cognitive Representationalism (CR):  the phenomenal character of thought  
 
supervenes on its intentional content.i  
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Proponents of CR argue that occurrent thoughts have phenomenal character, and that this 
phenomenal character is determined by (i.e., supervenes on) the intentional content of thought. 
 Bayne and McClelland raise a puzzle for proponents of CR which they call the matching content 
challenge. The challenge is as follows. Suppose CR is true, and the phenomenal character of thought is 
determined by its intentional content. Suppose also that perceptual representationalism (PR) is true, and 
the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is determined by the intentional content of that 
experience. Now, consider two different experiences: call the experience of visually perceiving that 
there is a blue wall before me V, and call the experience of thinking that that there is a blue wall before 
me T. Intuitively, these experiences have the same contents. If, however, both CR and PR are true, 
then there is some overlap in phenomenology between V and T, since their phenomenal character 
supervenes on their intentional content, and their intentional content is the same. But, Bayne and 
McClelland hold, there is no discernable phenomenological overlap between V and T: seeing a blue 
wall before me seems utterly different, phenomenologically, than thinking that there is a blue wall before 
me. Therefore, Bayne and McClelland conclude, CR should be rejected.  
 My goal in this paper is to defend CR against the matching content challenge. As we’ll see, a 
structurally analogous challenge arises for a version of PR: the same intentional content can occur 
across different sensory modalities with seemingly different phenomenal properties. I explain how 
proponents of PR can parry this challenge and argue that the same strategies are open to the proponent 
of CR as well. CR and PR are species of a more general form of representationalism about 
consciousness; as such, their fates stand and fall together.  
 Here is the plan. In §1, I lay out the matching content challenge to CR, explaining that the 
challenge is best formulated when positing an identity relation between phenomenal character and 
intentional content. In §2, I explain how the matching content challenge can be extended to pose a 
challenge to PR. I then explore two responses to the challenge, both of which appeal to the notion of 
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intentional mode. §3 gives a concessive response, arguing that the representationalist can explain why 
there is no overlap in phenomenal character between T and V by appealing to the difference in 
intentional mode. §4 gives a more steadfast response, arguing that the representationalist can insist 
that there is some phenomenal overlap between T and V. Because they represent the same content 
under different modes, T and V are determinates of the same phenomenal determinable.  
 
1. The Matching Content Challenge  
Our first order of business is to get clear on what the target of the matching content challenge is and 
how the challenge ought to be formulated. Recall our statement of CR: it says that the phenomenal 
character of thought supervenes on its intentional content. That is, there can be no change in thought’s 
phenomenal character without there being some change in its content. CR can thus be seen as the 
cognitive analogue to a popular claim about the relationship between perceptual phenomenology and 
its intentional content:  
 
Perceptual Representationalism (PR):  the phenomenal character of perception 
supervenes on its intentional content.ii  
 
Notice the parallel structure between CR and PR: they both say that a certain kind of phenomenal 
character supervenes on a certain kind of intentional content. Both CR and PR are species of a more 
general representationalist thesis:  
 
General Representationalism (GR): for any experience e, the phenomenal character 
of e supervenes on the intentional content of e.  
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GR says that for any experience whatsoever, its phenomenal character supervenes on its intentional 
content. Note that this thesis extends to experiences that are arguably neither cognitive nor perceptual, 
e.g., experiences of attention, agency, desire, and so on.  
 Representationalism is defined here as a supervenience thesis: it says that there can be no 
difference in the phenomenal character of experience without some difference in its content. What 
explains the truth of this supervenience thesis? To explain the supervenience thesis, proponents of 
intentionalism typically identify the phenomenal character of experience with the property of 
representing a certain kind of intentional content. To see how this identity claim explains 
supervenience, notice that if a state’s phenomenal properties are identical to some of its intentional 
properties, and we vary the phenomenal properties, we thereby vary some of its intentional properties. 
On the identity view, to have a phenomenal experience of some kind just is to represent the world as 
being a certain way.iii We can state this as the following claim:  
 
Phenomenal Intentional Identity (PII): every phenomenal property is identical to some 
representational property.  
   
The reason why there can’t be any change in phenomenal properties without a change in content is 
that phenomenal properties are identical with representational properties, i.e., properties of representing 
a content.iv Hence, PII entails GR.  
Some hold that there are phenomenal properties that are not identical to a representational 
properties (i.e., there are non-intentional “qualia”)(Block 1996). It is difficult, however, to see how 
one could on this view explain the supervenience of the phenomenal on the intentional: if phenomenal 
properties are non-intentional, then surely it is possible to vary these phenomenal properties without 
thereby varying representational properties. One holding that some or all phenomenal properties are 
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not identical to representational properties would have to posit unattractive brute necessary 
connections between phenomenal properties and representational properties in order to explain 
supervenience.   
 Given that identity is symmetric, PII entails a restricted supervenience relationship in the 
opposite direction of CR: some of a state’s intentional properties supervene on its phenomenal 
properties. We might call these its phenomenal-intentional properties. The supervenience relationship 
in this direction is restricted because the logical form of PII is “all Xs are Ys”, which does not entail 
that “all Ys are Xs (in this case, PII does not entail that all representational properties are phenomenal 
properties). If there are good theoretical reasons to think that there exist unconscious intentional 
states, or “wide” intentional contents determined by factors extrinsic to phenomenal character, then 
PII allows for these. If one denies that there is unconscious or wide intentionality (Pitt 2004, Farkas 
2008, Mendelovici 2018) then one would not need the supervenience thesis in this direction to be 
restricted. But, PII is not committed to denying this. What PII is committed to is that a state’s 
phenomenal-intentional properties are determined by (i.e., supervene on) its phenomenology.  
 Some proponents of PII go on to endorse a further thesis about phenomenal-intentional 
properties being reducible. For instance, Michael Tye holds that phenomenal properties are intentional 
properties, and that these phenomenal-intentional properties are reducible to further functional 
properties (Tye 1995, 2000). But one can accept the identity claim that all phenomenal properties are 
intentional properties without being a reductivist about phenomenal-intentional properties (see, for 
example, Pautz 2013, Mendelovici 2018, Smithies 2019). In explaining GR by adopting PII, one need 
not commit to a further claim about reduction.  
  Turning now to the matching content challenge, I formulate the challenge as targeting these 
species of phenomenal-intentional identifications entailed by PII:  
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Cognitive Phenomenal Intentional Identity (CPII): every cognitive phenomenal 
property is identical with some 
representational property.  
 
Perceptual Phenomenal Intentional Identity (PPII): every perceptual phenomenal 
property is identical with some 
representational property.  
 
I focus on formulating the challenge against CPII, as it is plausibly the standard intentionalist 
explanation of CR—the reason why there can’t be a change in cognitive phenomenal properties 
without a change in intentional content is because every cognitive phenomenal property is identical 
with representing some intentional content. By formulating the challenge as targeting CPII, we capture 
Bayne and McClelland’s target claim while getting to the heart of the matter. Further, targeting CPII 
brings out the parallels between CPII and PPII. Indeed, this parallel structure is crucial for generating 
the matching content challenge, and for extending the challenge to cases of cross-modal perception 
in §2.   
 Following Bayne and McClelland, let T be the conscious thought that there is a blue wall 
before me, and let V be the visual experience of there being a blue wall before me. We can now 
formulate the matching content challenge against CPII as a reductio ad absurdum:  
 
CPII, for reductio (1) Every cognitive phenomenal property is identical with some 
representational property.    
PPII (2) Every perceptual phenomenal property is identical with some 
representational property.  
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Stipulation (3) T and V have the same intentional content, i.e., the property of 
representing that there is a blue wall before me.   
from (1) (4) T has some phenomenal property that is identical with the property of 
representing that there is a blue wall before me.  
from (2) (5) V has some phenomenal property that is identical with the property 
of representing that there is a blue wall before me.  
from (3)-(5) (6) There is some phenomenal property shared in common between V 




(7) There is no phenomenal property shared in common between V and 
T.  
(8) Therefore, it’s not the case that every cognitive phenomenal property 
is identical with some representational property.  
 
I now comment briefly on each of the premises.  
(1) is a statement of cognitive phenomenal intentional identity, assumed for reductio. This is 
the identity relationship between cognitive phenomenal properties and representational properties that 
explains why the former supervenes on the latter.  (2) is a statement of PPII. This is the perceptual 
analogue of CPII; more on perceptual representationalism in §2.  
(3) is the stipulation that T and V have representational properties that are identical to one 
another. This claim, like the claim that T and V have “matching content,” is ambiguous between two 
interpretations. One might read (3) as making the universal claim that for every representational 
property, T has this property if and only if V has it; or, one might read it as making the existential 
claim that there exists some representational property such that T and V both have it. Following 
Bayne and McClelland (2016, p. 30), I adopt the universal interpretation, but note that the weaker, 
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existential reading would also allow the argument to go through when combined with the assumption 
that the representational property T and V share is identical to a phenomenal property of each 
experience.  
(4) and (5) follow from (1) and (2), respectively. If every cognitive phenomenal property is 
identical with some representational property, then the cognitive phenomenal property of T will be 
identical with T’s representational property, the property of representing that there is a blue wall before 
me. The same will hold mutatis mutandis for V and its perceptual phenomenal property.   
(6) follows from (3)-(5) in virtue of the transitivity of identity: if T has some phenomenal 
property identical to the property of representing that there is a blue wall before me, and this same 
representational property is identical to a phenomenal property of V, then T and V will have 
phenomenal properties identical to one another. In other words, T will have some phenomenal 
property identical with a phenomenal property of V in virtue of the experiences’ representational 
properties being identical. 
(7) is claimed to be an introspective datum: introspection does not seem to reveal any shared 
phenomenal quality between an experience of thinking that there is a blue wall before you and a visual 
experience of there being a blue wall before you. Bayne and McClelland maintain that there is no 
common phenomenal property contributed by the identical representational property between T and 
V.  
The conclusion follows from the contradiction derived in (6) and (7). In order to avoid this 
result, the representationalist who seeks to explain CR in terms of CPII will have to deny one of the 
other premises of the matching content challenge. Bayne and McClelland survey the prospects for 
denying (2), the stipulation that T and V have identical representational properties. In particular, they 
focus on different ways of interpreting the claim that conscious thoughts like T have conceptual content, 
where this difference in content kind is responsible for there being no phenomenal overlap between 
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T and V.  I will not challenge this premise, since it’s plausible that T and V have a representational 
property in common. Instead, I will explore responses that appeal to the fact that this representational 
property is represented in different ways—that is, by means of different intentional modes.  
 
2. Extending the Challenge to Perceptual Representationalism 
Before responding to the matching content challenge, however, I show in this section that the 
challenge is not limited cognitive representationalism. The challenge can be extended to perceptual 
representationalism, and representationalism about phenomenal consciousness generally.  
To remind ourselves, recall that cognitive phenomenal intentional identity (CPII) and 
perceptual phenomenal intentional identity (PPII) are both species of phenomenal intentional identity 
(PII). As such, both CPII and PPII are subject to counterexamples if we can find two states with the 
same representational property but without any phenomenal property in common. This is the thrust 
of the matching content challenge to CPII. PPII, however, is also subject to the matching content 
challenge if we can find two perceptual experiences in different sensory modalities that have identical 
representational properties without any shared phenomenal property. Ned Block illustrates this in the 
following case:  
 
Suppose I have an auditory experience as of something overhead, and a simultaneous visual 
experience as of something overhead . . . The phenomenal contents of both experiences 
represent something as being overhead, but there is no common phenomenal quality of the 




When having an auditory experience as of something overhead and a visual experience as of something 
overhead, one has two experiences with the same representational property, the property of 
representing something overhead. But, according to Block, there is no common phenomenal property 
in virtue of this shared representational property. Other examples in the literature include visual 
experience of seeing something round versus the haptic experience of feeling something round (Tye 
2000, Speaks 2015).  
 We can thus run a structurally similar version of the matching content challenge for PPII. Let 
A be an auditory experience as of something overhead, and let B be a visual experience as of something 
overhead. The matching content challenge for PPII then goes like this:  
 
PPII, for reductio (1') Every perceptual phenomenal property is identical with some 
representational property.  
Stipulation (2') A and B have the same intentional content, i.e., the property of 
representing something overhead.   
from (1) (3') A has some phenomenal property that is identical with the property 
of representing something overhead.  
from (1) (4') B has some phenomenal property that is identical with the property of 
representing something overhead. 
(2)-(4) (5') There is some phenomenal property shared in common between A 
and B.  
Introspective datum (6') There is no phenomenal property shared in common between A and 
B.  
Conclusion (7') Therefore, it’s not the case that every phenomenal property is identical 
with some representational property.  
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If PPII is true, then your visual experience and your auditory experience alike will have some 
phenomenal property that is identical to the same representational property: the property of 
representing something overhead. If both perceptual experiences have this representational property, 
and PPII is true, then we expect there to be to some common phenomenal property in virtue of this 
representational property. But introspection apparently reveals no such common phenomenology. On 
this version of the matching content challenge, PPII is false.  
 Notice that the structure of the matching content challenge for PPII mirrors the structure of 
the matching content challenge to CPII. Taken together, both threaten the general thesis of PII, that 
every experience has some phenomenal property identical with its representational property. Must 
those representationalists seeking to explain the apparent supervenience of the phenomenal on the 
intentional abandon this position in light of the matching content challenge?  
 In the rest of the paper, I argue that the identity form of representationalism can answer the 
matching content challenge in one of two ways. While both responses appeal to the notion of intentional 
modes, the responses differ as to whether they grant the alleged introspective datum that T and V (and 
A and B) have a phenomenal property in common. §3 gives a concessive response. If the 
representationalist grants the alleged datum, then they can explain why these experiences have no 
common phenomenal property: the same representational property is present under different 
intentional modes. I show that this response is available to the cognitive representationalist as well as 
the perceptual representationalist. §4 gives a steadfast response, arguing that there is a common 
phenomenal property between thoughts and perceptions with the same content. When two 
experiences represent the same content under distinct intentional modes, these experiences are two 
determinates of the same phenomenal determinable. The upshot of these responses is that, as far as 
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the matching content challenge is concerned, perceptual representationalism and cognitive 
representationalism stand or fall together.  
 
3. Concessive Response: Holistic Impure Representationalism 
The first response to the matching content challenge concedes the alleged introspective datum in both 
versions of the challenge. That is, it grants that there is no phenomenal property shared in common 
between my thought and my perception, nor between my visual perception and my auditory 
perception. The response, however, denies the form of representationalism assumed in the statement 
of PII, and so denies each of its species of (1) and (1). As we’ll see, the representationalist can retreat 
to a position that holds two experiences with the same representational property can have this property 
under different intentional modes, such that the phenomenal contribution of the content is 
transfigured by the mode under which it is represented. According to the concessive response, a 
thought and a perception with the same representational property need not have any phenomenal 
property in common.  
 Let’s first recall our statement of PII: every phenomenal property is identical with some 
representational property. At the outset, the representationalist can distinguish between pure and impure 
representational properties (Chalmers 2004). As stated, PII assumes that every phenomenal property 
is identical with some pure representational property. A pure representational property is the property 
of representing an intentional content. In contrast, an impure representational property is the property 
of representing a content under an intentional mode (Crane 2003). We can then state impure PII as follows:  
 
Impure Phenomenal Intentional Identity: Every phenomenal property is identical to 
some impure representational property.  
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According to impure PII, every phenomenal property is identical to some property of representing a 
content under an intentional mode. What is the intentional mode of a mental state? It is the way in 
which an intentional content is represented; it is what Chalmers (2004) calls the “manner of 
representation.” For example, when one sees something overhead, one is representing the content 
that there is a plane overhead in the mode of vision. When one hears something overhead, one 
represents the same content in the mode of audition. Appealing to the intentional mode captures the 
way in which the attitude a subject takes toward a content can contribute to the subject’s phenomenal 
character.  
 Impure PII says that every phenomenal property is identical with some impure 
representational property, where an impure representational property is the property of representing 
a content under a certain mode. Now, impure PII is not yet enough to block the challenge: impure 
PII concedes that a representational property is an element that determines a phenomenal property. 
Phenomenal properties are identical to impure representational properties, which are themselves 
representational properties under intentional modes, so a representational property is on the right-
hand side of the equals sign in the identity relation. Despite having different intentional modes, A and 
B have the same content figuring into the determination of their phenomenal properties. Because of 
this shared content, shouldn’t we still expect some overlap in phenomenology, some common 
phenomenal property between A and B, where none is apparently found?   
 To block the challenge, we must reject the atomistic model of how the phenomenal character 
of a mental state is determined. On the atomistic model, a mental state’s phenomenal character is 
determined by adding the phenomenal atoms of the state: the phenomenal character of the 
representational property and the phenomenal character of the state’s intentional mode. If this were 
the case, then there would be some phenomenal property identical to a pure representational 
property—some discernable aspect of the mental state’s phenomenal character has in virtue of its 
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content. If the atomistic model were correct, then the representationalist could not adopt impurism 
to reject (1). For it would follow, then, that A and B having a common pure representational property 
entails a common phenomenal property. Indeed, our statement of impure PII says that every 
phenomenal property is identical to some impure phenomenal property. This should be understood 
as entailing that no phenomenal property is identical to some pure representational property.  The 
atomistic model cannot block the challenge because it entails there would be some phenomenal 
property identical to a pure representational property: the intentional mode contributes to the 
phenomenal character of the state, but the representational property makes an isolable contribution 
as well. We therefore must reject the atomistic model of impure PII.  
 How then must the representationalist understand the way in which impure representational 
properties determine phenomenal properties? They must adopt impurism on the holistic model. On the 
holistic model, the phenomenal contribution of the intentional content is transfigured by the intentional 
mode of the attitude, such that the state’s overall phenomenal character cannot be decomposed into 
isolable parts.v We can think of the state’s overall phenomenal character as determined by a function, 
and the representational property—the property of having an intentional content—is an argument in 
the function. The representational property contributes to the state’s phenomenal character, but not 
in a way that this contribution can be isolated from the state’s overall phenomenology. On this model, 
the phenomenal character of the whole is not determined compositionally by merely adding up the 
phenomenal character of the parts. The holistic model of impure PII avoids the problems of the 
atomistic model because no pure phenomenal property survives the process of transfiguration by the 
state’s intentional mode.  
 To see how adopting impure PII on the holistic model works as a response to the matching 
content challenge against PPII, let’s consider an example. When I visually perceive something 
overhead and when I auditorily perceive something overhead, these two mental states share a 
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representational property: the property of having the content “there is something overhead.” The 
representationalist is committed to this property figuring in the determination of the states’ 
phenomenal character. On impure PII, however, the intentional mode transfigures the contribution 
of the phenomenal character made by the representational property. So, seeing something overhead 
and hearing something overhead is sufficient for the states to lack any phenomenal property in 
common despite their shared representational property. Indeed, holistic impure PII can explain why: 
the difference in intentional modes transfigures the content such that there isn’t any common 
phenomenal property between the two states. The representationalist insistent on the alleged 
introspective datum thus has phenomenological reasons for adopting the holistic model. They should 
thus reject the form of PPII presupposed by the challenge: instead of saying that every perceptual 
phenomenal property is identical with some pure representational property, they can say that every 
perceptual phenomenal property is identical with some impure representational property. Because A 
and B have different impure representational properties in virtue of their different modes, on the 
holistic model they need not have any phenomenal property in common.  
 Impure PII is a familiar view (Lycan 1996, Chalmers 2004, Crane 2007). We’ve shown, 
however, how adopting it on the holistic model can be used to answer the matching content challenge. 
What’s more, it is available to the cognitive representationalist who endorses CPII just as well as the 
perceptual representationalist endorsing PPII. In the matching content challenge against CPII, (1) says 
that every cognitive phenomenal property is identical to some representational property. Because my 
visually perceiving a blue wall and my thought that there is a blue wall have an identical pure 
representational property, and the phenomenal character of the perception and the thought are 
identical to this representational property, we would expect some common phenomenal property 
between my perception and my thought. The cognitive representationalist can retreat from (1) by 
adopting impure CPII: every cognitive phenomenal property is identical to some impure 
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representational property. The difference in intentional mode between T and V entails that these 
experiences have different impure representational properties, and on the holistic model, their shared 
pure representational property does not determine any common phenomenal property in either state. 
The key point is that shared content will not make a common, isolable contribution to the phenomenal 
character. It’s not just perceptual modes, such as vision and audition, that are unable to be decomposed 
from the content when it comes to the contribution they make to the states’ phenomenal character. 
Cognitive modes, such as judging, wondering, or entertaining, also intertwine with the content of the 
state such that the phenomenal contribution of the content can’t be isolated across different modes.  
 So, the representationalist can adopt impure phenomenal intentional identity on the holistic 
model to block the matching content challenge. For a representationalist who accepts the alleged 
introspective datum, this move is especially attractive, because it explains the alleged introspective 
datum in a way friendly to representationalism. The holistic model explains why there is no common 
phenomenal property between the two experiences, despite their shared intentional content. The 
contribution to the phenomenal character by the intentional content is transfigured by the states’ 
intentional mode. The result is that overlap in pure representational property need not entail any 
overlap in phenomenal character. What’s more, while this move is available for the perceptual 
representationalist, it is just as available for the cognitive representationalist.  
 
4. Steadfast Response: Phenomenal Determinables 
The previous section assumed for the sake of the argument the introspective datum that there is no 
shared phenomenal property between two mental states with identical representational properties but 
different intentional modes. By appealing to holistic impure PII, the representationalist can explain 
this alleged introspective datum. But we can now take a step back and ask: is this really an introspective 
datum? This section develops a steadfast response to the matching content challenge on behalf of the 
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representationalist, one that denies the introspective datum that T and V (and A and B) lack any 
phenomenal overlap. I argue that although these experiences differ in phenomenally determinate 
respects, they also overlap phenomenally in determinable respects, thus denying (7) in the matching 
content challenge against CPII (and (6) in the challenge against PPII).vi  
 Is there any phenomenal property shared in common between my visual experience of seeing 
that there is a blue wall before me and my cognitive experience of thinking that there is a blue wall 
before me? One reason to think that that these experiences share at least one phenomenal property is 
that, as experiences, they both share the phenomenal property of “being phenomenally conscious.” 
This is the most general determinable that all and only phenomenally conscious experiences share. If 
they didn’t share this highly determinable phenomenal property, then there would be nothing in virtue 
of which they all count as phenomenally conscious. There would be no common subject matter we 
would be picking out in describing my visual experience and my cognitive experience as 
“experiences.”vii 
 The existence of phenomenal determinables can be made vivid by considering one’s 
experiences of different color shades. Compare one’s visual experience of seeing scarlet and one’s 
visual experience of seeing crimson. These experiences are phenomenally different, and yet there is 
something phenomenally in common between the two: the determinable property of seeing red. The 
experience of scarlet and the experience of crimson are more like one another than either is to the 
experience of seeing blue. What explains this similarity? These are two different determinates of a 
shared determinable phenomenal property—namely, what it’s like to see red.   
 Other phenomenal determinables corresponding to different sensory modalities are manifest. 
Consider the difference between visually experiencing color and visually experiencing shape. Seeing 
red is more similar to seeing blue than seeing square—these experiences have the property of being a 
visual experience of color. Seeing red and seeing square are more similar to one another, however, 
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than either is to hearing noise. This is because both experiences are determinates of a phenomenal 
determinable—namely, the property of being a visual experience. Seeing red and seeing square differ 
phenomenally in virtue of the different ways this phenomenal determinable property is instantiated. 
Nevertheless, it seems very natural to group these two experiences together in virtue of their both 
having the phenomenology of vision.  
 Seeing color and hearing a Chopin nocturne are phenomenally quite different, yet they are 
more similar to each other than either is to an experience of thinking about philosophy. Experiences 
in different sensory modalities share the determinable phenomenal property being sensory. Further, the 
experience of thinking about philosophy and judging that a claim is true are more similar to each other 
than either are to seeing color. These experience both share the phenomenal determinable of being 
cognitive. We can begin to discern a structure of determinates and determinables (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1  
 
These groupings suggest the existence of a hierarchy of increasingly determinable phenomenal 
properties. The phenomenal determinable properties in the figure above are determined by a state’s 
intentional mode. When I have the auditory experience of hearing my wife from down the hall, I 
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experience some content, e.g., my wife speaking down the hall, in the mode of audition. 
Representationalists, however, are committed to the claim that a mental state’s representational 
property determines its phenomenal character. Are there phenomenal determinables on the content 
side, such that two mental states with the same content might have the same determinable phenomenal 
property?  
 Consider one’s tactile experience of feeling a round-shaped object and one’s visual experience 
of seeing a round-shaped object. It is plausible that both experiences have the same representational 
property, being round-shaped. This representational property is itself a determinable property, as one 
can represent roundness in determinate ways. One can visually represent roundness and one can 
tactually represent roundness. What’s more, this determinable representational property is a phenomenal 
determinable property: there is something distinctive it’s like to represent roundness. We tend to focus 
on the determinate properties of visually representing roundness and tactually representing roundness. 
But these are two different determinates of the same phenomenal determinable.viii  
 One might object: the phenomenology of my tactile experiences and the phenomenology of 
my visual experience feel very different from one another. In reply, we can explain why they feel so 
different: the differences in intentional mode make a drastic phenomenal difference. This is consistent, 
however, with there being a common determinable phenomenal property: the property of consciously 
representing roundness that they share in virtue of sharing a representational property. The 
introspective datum here, that there are drastic phenomenal differences between the experiences in 
question, shows that these experiences are not exactly the same in phenomenal respects. But it doesn’t 
mean that there are no respects of phenomenal similarity between them. It’s a mistake—though 
perhaps a natural one—to focus exclusively on the phenomenal differences at the expense of 
overlooking the phenomenal similarities. It may be difficult to notice the phenomenal similarities 
because of the striking phenomenal difference made by the difference in intentional mode. This is 
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why seeing a round-shaped object is phenomenally more like seeing something overhead than seeing 
a round-shaped object is like feeling a round-shaped object. But this doesn’t entail that there is nothing 
phenomenally in common between two experiences when they share a representational property 
(though the phenomenal similarities may be hard to notice). There are phenomenal differences 
determined by intentional mode, and as well as differences in intentional content, and these differences 
crosscut one another.  
 There is no commitment to the claim that one can instantiate the determinable property of 
representing that p without instantiating it in some or other determinate way, under some or other 
intentional mode. This seems true of determinates and determinables generally. One cannot have a 
mass without having some or other particular mass. But, what explains what two objects with two 
particular masses have in common is that they share the determinable property of having a mass. 
Likewise, what explains what my tactile experience of roundness and my visual experience of 
roundness have in common is that they both have the phenomenal determinable property of 
representing roundness. This determinable property is a distinct property from its determinate 
properties, despite the fact that instantiating the determinable entails instantiating a determinate. ix  
 The representationalist can thus respond to the matching content challenge against PPII by 
denying the introspective datum, (6′). It’s not the case that my visual experience of something overhead 
and my auditory experience of something overhead have no identical phenomenal property. They both 
have the determinable phenomenal property of representing something overhead. Of course, these 
two experiences do feel very different, phenomenologically. But the representationalist can explain 
this: the difference in intentional mode makes for a striking phenomenal difference.  
 This response to the matching content challenge against PPII shows that two state with the 
same representational property but different perceptual attitudes (vision and audition) can have a 
common phenomenal property in virtue of sharing this representational property despite differing 
 21 
phenomenally in virtue of their difference in attitude. Notice, however, that this move is available 
when it comes to cognitive attitudes as well.  
 Suppose I’m wondering whether or not Biden will win the election at time T1. After much 
deliberation, I judge that Biden will win the election at time T2. Then I start thinking about something 
else—that the electoral college is problematic—at time T3. Plausibly, there is a phenomenal similarity 
between T1 and T2 that doesn’t exist between T1 and T3. The mental states at T1 and T2 have 
different cognitive attitudes but the same intentional contents, and it is highly plausible that there is 
an identical phenomenal determinable between the two states in virtue of this content.x One’s 
wondering and one’s judgment are about the same thing; there will thus be a felt similarity between 
the two cognitive experiences insofar as they share the same topic. To see this, note the phenomenal 
contrast one undergoes when one understands the phrase “visiting relatives can be boring” first as a 
statement about relatives that are visiting and later as a phrase about the act of visiting relatives. This 
phenomenal contrast is one of interpretative switch. Cases of interpretive switch have been used to 
argue that a difference in content makes a phenomenal difference (Siewert 1998, Horgan and Tienson 
2002). But cases of interpretive switch also seem to show that an overlap in representational properties 
makes for an overlap in phenomenal properties. In light of these points, a general one can be made: a 
state’s representational property, i.e., the property of representing a content, makes a phenomenal 
contribution. When one entertains some content, and later judges that same content, there are 
phenomenal groupings between one’s entertainment and one’s judgment in virtue of their shared 
content.  
 When we compare the phenomenology of consciously entertaining that Biden will win the 
election and the phenomenology of consciously judging that Biden will win the election, the 
phenomenal contribution of this content is relatively easy to discern. This is because the intentional 
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modes are relatively phenomenally similar. Entertaining and judging both instantiate the determinable 
phenomenal property being cognitive. 
 Notice, however, that the same is true of V and T. Both experiences have different 
determinates of the same determinable property. We can now explain how the representationalist can 
respond to the matching content challenge against CPII. As before, the representationalist can deny 
the introspective datum (7). It’s not the case that my visual perception of a blue wall before me and 
my thought that there is a blue wall before me have no identical phenomenal property. They both have 
the determinable phenomenal property of representing the content “blue wall before me.” This 
phenomenal property will be difficult to notice. But we can explain why this is the case: the difference 
between a cognitive and perceptual intentional mode makes for a much more striking phenomenal 
difference than the difference between two different cognitive intentional modes, or two different 
perceptual intentional modes.  
 So, by appealing to phenomenal determinables, not only can the representationalist resist the 
matching content’s challenge insistence that there is no shared phenomenal character between T and 
V, but thy can explain why we might be tempted to grant the introspective datum: there is a greater 
phenomenal difference between perceiving and judging than there is between judging and entertaining. 
This drastic difference in intentional mode makes it such that the shared phenomenal determinable, 
“being a blue wall before me”, is easy to overlook in introspection.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Here are the main conclusions of the paper: 
 First, the matching content challenge is not unique to cognitive experience: it extends from 
cognitive representationalism to perceptual representationalism, thereby threatening 
representationalist theories of experience in general.  
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 Second, just as the challenge is general, so too are the solutions. If the perceptual 
representationalist can respond to the challenge in the ways I’ve argued for, then the cognitive 
representationalist can too. Perceptual representationalism and cognitive representationalism should 
thus be seen on equal dialectical footing.  
Third, the representationalist can give a concessive response to the matching content challenge 
by appealing to the holistic model of impure phenomenal intentional identity. This response concedes 
the alleged introspective datum that T and V share no phenomenal character but explains why we 
should expect this: the difference in intentional mode between T and V transfigures the phenomenal 
contribution of their shared representational property such that we ought not expect a common 
phenomenal property between the two. If the representationalist adopts the alleged introspective 
datum, then they must adopt the holistic model of impure PII.  
 Fourth, the representationalist can give a steadfast response to the challenge, denying the 
alleged introspective datum and insisting that T and V share the phenomenal determinable property 
“blue wall before me.” This phenomenal property might be easy to overlook, but the 
representationalist can again explain why this is the case: the difference in perceptual mode of vision 
and the cognitive mode of thought makes for a very striking phenomenal difference.  
 Fifth, the concessive and steadfast responses offer ways of responding to the matching content 
challenge that do not require denying the plausible claim that T and V share some representational 
property in common. They thus avoid any problematic consequences involved in taking on the claim 
that T has, while V lacks, “conceptual content.” 
 Sixth, the general lesson of the two responses is that, while phenomenal character may outrun 
intentional content, it does not outrun intentionality. When theorizing about the relationship between 
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i Bayne and McClelland cite Horgan and Graham (2012), Horgan and Tienson (2002), Siewert (1998), Pitt (2004), and 
Smithies (2014) as endorsing CR. Bayne and McClelland’s statement of CR, which they label “the phenomenal content 
thesis,” also includes the claim that the kind of phenomenal character that thoughts have is distinctive of thought. While 
many proponents of CR endorse this distinctiveness claim—in particular, that the kind of phenomenal character that 
thoughts have is non-sensory—it isn’t compulsory.  
ii Perceptual representationalist views can be found in Tye (1995), Dretske (1995), Lycan (1996), Byrne (2001), Crane 
(2003), and Chalmers (2004), Speaks (2015), Brogaard (2018), and Mendelovici (2018). 
iii See Lycan (1996), Tye (2002), Chalmers (2004), Pautz (2013), Speaks (2015), Mendelovici (2018) and Smithies (2019) 
for identity views. 
iv I am assuming a relational view of phenomenal intentionality, according to which contents are abstract objects to which 
phenomenal properties stand in intentional relations (Pautz 2013, Bourget 2019). On a non-relational view, in contrast, 
phenomenal properties instantiate contents (Kriegel 2007, Mendelovici 2018). I assume the relational view for simplicity, 
but one could replace it with a non-relational view without substantially changing the overall dialectic. Thanks to an 
anonymous reviewer for urging me to make this assumption explicit.  




vi Some phenomenological accounts of pleasure hold that pleasure is a phenomenal determinable. See Kagan (1992), Crisp 
(2006), Smuts (2011), and Labukt (2012). This point has been made in response to the heterogeneity problem for 
hedonism, the objection that there is nothing that all pleasures have in common.  
vii One might protest: “being phenomenally conscious” is not itself a phenomenal property. In response, my view is that 
having a phenomenal property is just to be phenomenally conscious in some more or less specific way, and having the 
phenomenal property “being phenomenally conscious” is the most general way of being phenomenally conscious.  
viii The phenomenal determinable of representing that roundness is not a higher-order representation of its determinates; 
visually representing roundness and tactually representing roundness are simply different determinates of a determinable 
first-order property. 
ix Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this issue.  
 
x It seems that I can know by introspection when I am occurrently wondering that p or when I am occurrently judging that 
p. It has been argued that I could only have this introspective knowledge—that I am wondering and judging about p rather 
than about q, and that these attitudes are directed toward the same content—if there was something it was like to wonder 
and judge that p as opposed to wondering and judging that q. See Pitt (2004). 
